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AGREEING TO DISAGREE OVER
EXCESSIVE TRADING
Lynn A. Stout
T HE heterogeneous expectations ("HE") model of trading ana-
lyzes stock trading as a problem of differing information costs.
Because investors have access to different and imperfect subsets of
information, they disagree with each other and with market prices
in estimating stock values. And because investors-especially nov-
ice investors-also lack perfect information about their relative
stock-picking skills, the subset of the investing population who esti-
mate that their skills are above average may try to profit from their
disagreement by buying and selling stocks that they believe are
mispriced. Over time, traders acquire new information about their
relative trading skills that teaches a portion of those who thought
that they could "beat the market" that their original, optimistic
estimates of their own abilities were inaccurate. Yet even as losing
traders exit the market, a new generation of inexperienced traders
arrives, necessarily lacking the information required to avoid the
prior generation's mistakes.'
In contrast, noise trader models of stock trading are explicitly
grounded on the premise that a substantial portion of traders are
irrational. Although what is meant by "irrational" is not always
made clear, the noise literature seems for the most part to presume
that a subset of investors suffer cognitive defects that render them
unable to make unbiased estimates and to distinguish information
from "noise." Trading by "rational" investors (who are presuma-
bly free of such cognitive defects) fails to eliminate the distortive
effects of noise traders' transactions, because noise traders add
market risk that limits rational traders' willingness to bet against
them.
I See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market
Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 Va. L. Rev. 611 (1995).
2 See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. Fn. 529 (1986); J. Bradford De Long, Andrei Shleifer,
Lawrence H. Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98
J. Pol. Econ. 703, 734-35 (1990); J. Bradford De Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H.
Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, The Size and Incidence of the Losses from Noise
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As these brief sketches suggest, HE theory and noise trader the-
ory rely on differing assumptions, hypothesize differing market
mechanisms, offer many differing positive predictions, and carry
several differing policy implications. For example, because the HE
model is premised on imperfect information, it predicts that wel-
fare losses from HE trading might be reduced by disclosure rules
that provide investors with more complete information concerning
either stock values or their own relative trading abilities.3 Noise
traders are hypothesized to suffer innate cognitive defects that
render them, presumably, beyond help. Noise theory suggests that
stock market prices depart from fundamental values because noise
traders add to market prices risk that deters rational investors from
fully arbitraging away price distortions. Under the HE model,
even perfect arbitrage cannot ensure that market prices equal fun-
damental values, because the very concept of fundamental value
becomes elusive in a market where equilibrium prices only aggre-
gate the differing expectations of investors who are all imperfectly
informed to lesser or greater degrees.4
Although HE theory and noise theory differ in their premises
and many of their results, Professor Paul Mahoney argues in the
pages of this journal that they share an important similarity. In
particular, he argues that they both presume some type (although
perhaps different types) of investor irrationality.5 In making this
point, Mahoney raises the interesting and curious question: Can
rational investors disagree?
A body of work in game theory posits that it is, indeed, irrational
to trade on the basis of heterogeneous expectations. Rational
investors cannot "agree to disagree."6 The intuition underlying this
surprising result is that parties who rely on different, imperfect sub-
Trading, 44 1. Fu. 681, 694 (1989); J. Bradford De Long, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H.
Summers & Robert J. Waldmann, The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets, 64 J.
Bus. 1, 18 (1991); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Noise Trader Approach
to Finance, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 1990, at 19, 31.
3 Stout, supra note 1, at 691-702.
4 Id. at 651-56.
5 Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure for "Excessive" Trading?, 81 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1995).
6 See Robert J. Aumann, Agreeing To Disagree, 4 Annals Stat. 1236 (1976); John D.
Geanakoplos & Heraldis M. Polemarchakis, We Can't Disagree Forever, 28 J. Econ.
Theory 192 (1982); Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade and Common
Knowledge, 26 J. Econ. Theory 17 (1982).
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sets of information in making estimates of the probability of an
event should recognize that their estimates are potentially flawed
and be willing to revise them in light of another's disagreement.
Thus bullish John should temper his enthusiasm to buy GM when
he learns that bearish Mary wants to sell because he knows she
may have information he does not.7
On first inspection, the "no-speculation" literature may seem to
imply that HE trading is irrational (as opposed to ill-informed)
behavior. Closer analysis reveals this is not necessarily the case.
The no-speculation result depends on the strong assumptions that
all investors share "concordant beliefs" (meaning that all traders
process information in an identical fashion and all would make the
same estimates given the same data) and that concordant beliefs
are "common knowledge" (meaning that all investors know that all
investors have concordant beliefs).8 The assumptions of concor-
dant beliefs and common knowledge explain why John is so willing
to revise his estimate downward when he learns of Mary's disa-
greement; John respects Mary's judgment because he knows that
she interprets information just as he does, and would not be willing
to sell GM unless she had access to information that would lead
John, too, to conclude GM was overpriced.
Because the no-speculation result depends on concordant beliefs
and common knowledge, it may not apply when investors believe
other market participants may be trading for reasons other than
disagreement with market prices. Thus John may not fully revise
his optimistic estimate downwards if he believes there is a chance
that Mary is selling GM because she needs money or a more bal-
anced portfolio rather than because she has information suggesting
GM is overvalued. Similarly, the assumptions of concordant
beliefs and common knowledge are violated if John thinks Mary
7 Interestingly, the no-speculation literature also concludes that even when parties who
initially disagree revise their prior estimates to reach a common valuation, that valuation is
not necessarily the same valuation that they would reach if they had shared information.
See Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis, supra note 6, at 199 (noting phenomenon but
suggesting that its occurrence is rare). This result of the no-speculation literature
somewhat resembles HE theory's prediction that when investors must form expectations
based on differing, imperfect subsets of information, market prices will not necessarily
reflect the "best," or most well-informed, estimate of value. See Stout, supra note 1, at
655-56.
8 See Milgrom & Stokey, supra note 6, at 19-20.
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might be behaving strategically, or is possibly irrational. In other
words, investors may trade on disagreement not because they
themselves are irrational, but because they believe others in the
market may be.9
The possibility that HE trading reflects positive information
costs rather than irrationality also is supported by evidence that
investors who lose money trying to "beat the market" may learn
from their experience and stop trying.10 Although the no-specula-
tion literature assumes that traders infer information from the
price-taking behavior of others in the market, it does not address
how they learn to do this. We are born into the world ignorant and
uninformed; our environment is a black box from which we draw
samples and infer information. Because most markets are con-
sumer goods markets driven by differences in tastes and in costs of
production, rather than speculative markets driven by differences
in information and expectations, the notion that one should revise
one's own valuation of an asset based on the prices others are will-
ing to pay is not obvious. Indeed, it was not apparent to econo-
mists until relatively recently.11 It seems plausible that a novice
investor who has not been lucky enough to have taken a course in
game theory might begin trading stocks unaware of the possibility
that other investors' willingness to trade with her is a signal that
something is amiss. Over time she may learn to hesitate before
selling to a willing buyer. Does this mean she has learned not to be
irrational? Or does it mean instead that her earlier trades reflected
ignorance of the import of others' price-taking behavior-in other
words, imperfect information?
At this theoretical level, the question whether it is rational for
investors to trade on disagreement is both interesting and difficult.
Perhaps academics must simply agree to disagree on the answer
9 See Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race, 6 Rev.
Fin. Stud. 473, 490 (1993) (concluding that stock trading generated by differences of
opinion is rational, although traders may view others as irrational).
10 Stout, supra note 1, at 635-41. A similar learning process has been found in some
experimental studies of the "winner's curse." Richard H. Thaler, The Winner's Curse:
Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life 50-62 (1992). The winner's curse is related to
HE trading because both phenomena involve optimistic self-selection under conditions of
uncertainty and disagreement, and both are inconsistent with the perfect revision of
expectations predicted by the no-speculation literature.
11 See sources cited note 6, supra.
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until they either acquire better information, or become more
rational.
At the practical level, however, the answer may be unimportant.
Whether HE trading reflects positive information costs or investor
irrationality, so long as investors trade on disagreement, a purely
laissez-faire approach to stock markets can invite welfare losses
that might be avoided under a regulatory scheme designed to
reduce the dispersion of investors' expectations, decrease the costs
of their mistakes, or hasten their learning. Neither Professor
Mahoney nor anyone else with experience in financial markets
seems eager to quarrel with the claim that disagreement exists and
that it plays an important role in stock trading. Given that reality,
it seems unwise (or even irrational) to ground analysis of securities
markets solely on elegant, but often inaccurate, financial models
built on the fragile assumptions of investor homogeneity and
agreement.
